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CAPITAL, HOUSING AND INEQUALITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY. 
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1. Shifting Fortunes, Changing Housing Policies. 
Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century (CTFC) (Piketty, 2014) has highlighted 
rising wealth inequalities in advanced economies. It has caught the attention of the press and 
public, permeated policy debates and stimulated a flow of academic writing on the political 
economy of capital accumulation and inequality. The merits and limits of CTFC have been 
dissected (Kunkel, 2014), critiqued (Bonnet et.al. 2014: Mankiw, 2015), and defended (Piketty, 
2015a, 2015b). Major papers on the costs of inequalities and measures to combat them have also 
been developed (Stiglitz et.al. 2015; Atkinson, 2014). 
Piketty’s work has a direct relevance for housing researchers. Wealth and income inequalities 
shape many of the spatial segregations and segmented socio-economic structures apparent within 
housing systems (van Ham et al, 2012)). The evidence presented in CTFC gives even greater 
significance to housing outcomes as they appear to be a major reinforcer of wealth and income 
inequalities in some advanced economies. Remarkably, given that significant role and the 
emerging conclusions from research on housing wealth (Searle and Koppe, 2014; Ronald and 
Forrest, 2014), there has been relatively little discussion of Piketty’s work in published housing 
research.  
Housing policymakers show little sign of engaging with the insights of CTFC, not least the 
implication that core housing policies may be reinforcing rather than reducing inequalities within 
and between generations. Although there is recognition of the economic role of the housing 
sector in impacting employment and influencing cyclical instabilities, it is rarely recognised in 
debates about economic growth (Maclennan et.al. 2015). More widely, there is contraction and 
fragmentation in housing policies in many advanced economies. 
 In contrast, this paper starts with the perspective that, first, a wider understanding of the macro 
outcomes of housing systems is required to make sense of how global capitalism has developed 
since the 1980’s and, second, that housing policy commitments across many OECD countries are 
now lagging behind housing needs and demands arising from associated processes of economic 
expansion, urbanisation and increased inequalities.  Piketty’s findings imply that rethinking both 
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the role of housing systems and the efficacy of housing policies are central to shaping more 
effective forms of capitalism.  
This paper aims to frame some of the key, possible connections between housing outcomes and 
Piketty’s findings. The next section (2) of the paper considers the ways in which inequality and 
growth aspects of housing outcomes have become side-lined in contemporary policymaking. 
Section (3) then sets out the key features and achievements of Piketty’s work. It is a far from 
complete review and it is intended as a prompt to a wider debate within housing research.  Major 
empirical and theoretical debates about CTFC are then discussed (section 4) and more explicit 
attention to the housing sector then introduced (section 5).  A brief conclusion is then presented 
(section 6). 
 
2. Placing Housing in Piketty’s Story. 
The empirical stories in CTFC indicate persistent high historical levels of wealth inequality that 
began to fall after the early decades of the twentieth century with that reduction prevailing 
through Piketty’s ‘short twentieth century’ until the1980’s when a still continuing period of 
rising wealth inequalities commenced. Although there are now encouraging convergences in 
incomes across countries (Sachs, 2008), income and wealth inequalities within nations are now 
rising and in some of the OECD economies, such as the US, inequalities are rising back to the 
peak levels of the later Belle Epoque. 
These broad phases of changing inequalities are correlated with the broad sweep of housing 
policies over the same period. That association might simply reflect policies reacting to growth 
and inequalities, but it might also arise because housing outcomes, and policies, also shape 
economic growth and urbanisation patterns. Housing systems and policies may be key 
mechanisms in shaping the inequalities Piketty observed and it is worthwhile noting these broad 
policy phases3. 
To the End of the Belle Epoque: active housing policies emerged in Europe in the later decades 
of the nineteenth century (in what Piketty refers to as the Belle Époque) amidst growing 
urbanisation, industrialisation and historically high inequalities (Hall, 1998). These inequalities 
pricked the consciences of paternalistic capitalists (Krugman, 2014; Glennerster et.al, 2004). 
Income inequality was seen to result in ‘cruel habitations’ for the poor (Gauldie, 1974) that 
blighted their prospects for wellbeing and progress. Private poverty was also quickly transformed 
into public squalor, and more affluent households faced the adverse health and other externalities 
that emanated from poor neighbourhoods. These ‘neighbourhood’ spillovers drove cities to 
initiate housing policies and also came to be seen as reinforcing inequalities arising from housing 
outcomes (Maclennan, 2013) 
                                                          
3 Housing researchers will be familiar with these broad patterns and indeed aware of the differences and nuances 
for particular countries. Beyond the realm of housing studies these broad patterns are not always understood but 
a knowledge of them is important in understanding how economies have developed over time. 
After the Great War to the 1980’s: after 1919, better housing for poorer households became a 
priority for governments. That interest was reinforced after 1945. For half a century at least, the 
provision of adequate and affordable homes for low income households became a core goal of 
governments of varied political complexions and a major element in public capital expenditure 
programmes. In welfare, corporatist and market societies alike, there was long, strong 
recognition of the importance of housing issues. Housing policies to address the wellbeing of the 
least advantaged mattered for much of Piketty’s ‘Short Twentieth Century’. In Western Europe 
and the Anglos Saxon countries, from the 1950’s to the 1980’s, proportions of national income 
committed to housing policies, and programmes of public capital expenditure and infrastructure 
investment, were often triple those prevailing by the 1990’s. Through this short ‘twentieth 
century Piketty observes falling inequalities (the Kuznets convergence). 
Post Reagan-Thatcher era:  a variety of labels have been applied to predominant paradigms in 
policymaking after the start of the 1980’s, that have included not just neoliberalism but modified 
Keynesianism (see Widmaier, 2016) and we do not dispute different labels and cases here. Over 
that period, both at national scales and in international bodies such as OECD and the IMF, a 
market/contestability housing policy paradigm has prevailed. Since the 1980’s a ‘modern’ suite 
of housing policies has emerged including; replacing dwelling subsidies with income-related 
assistance, shifting public housing to non-profit ownership, moving towards market rents, 
promoting home-ownership, deregulating mortgage markets and preferring tax expenditure 
supports to transparent subsidies. Arguably, albeit with greatly reduced resource levels, that 
policy approach still dominates in national and provincial/state thinking for housing policies 
across the OECD. 
Alongside labour market changes that have favoured higher income households, there have been 
significant changes in patterns of economic growth and housing. The sharp de-industrialisation 
of OECD cities from the 1970’s to the 1990’s (with growing concentrations of disadvantage) has 
been largely replaced by pro-urban economic growth seeking agglomeration and density 
(Glaeser, 2010). Metropolitan growth issues have supplanted city decline concerns by the start of 
this millennium. Metropolitan growth has generated tax revenues captured largely by non-local 
(national or state/provincial) governments as a result of rising vertical fiscal imbalances (OECD, 
2014). Non-local governments have tended to reduce budget supports for local housing and 
infrastructure systems. With metropolitan housing demands and needs running ahead of inelastic 
supplies, the post 1970’s period has been one of sustained increases in real house prices (Priemus 
and Maclennan, 2011). Monetary policy orthodoxy in central banks has chosen to ignore these 
issues until recent years.  
The interaction of these growth and housing price effects have been demonstrably important in 
many OECD cities for at least the last two decades, and they have shaped both the wealth 
patterns Piketty observes and the problems of delivering ‘affordable housing’. They may now be 
attenuating the productivity growth of ‘knowledge agglomerations’ (Maclennan et al 2015). 
Failure to understand housing systems and to implement policies to address them is arguably 
exacerbating income and wealth inequalities, reducing productivity growth and replacing 
entrepreneurial returns with a growing reliance on growing property rentier incomes. In turn, 
understanding these housing market outcomes, it is argued below, is key to understanding the 
patterns Piketty observes.  
 
Housing Policies after the Austerity; these processes and problems do not seem to fade away. 
Future economic growth is likely to be within existing metropolitan areas. Growth will still 
confront relatively inelastic housing supply systems. The ‘modern’ housing policy response to 
these market pressures has often been, weak, and in some instances perverse. But to date there 
are relatively few signs of resurgence in rethinking and resourcing housing policies at national 
levels. The now old ‘modern’ synthesis of housing policies does not seem to meet the challenges 
of new times. How can housing researchers begin to fashion new understandings that will shift 
housing policies? 
 
Housing researchers generally work with intellectual frameworks that recognise the 
interdependence of growth and income distribution as well as housing roles within these 
processes. But are these perspectives widespread? Do they penetrate the core debates in social 
and economic disciplines and policy-making? Are active housing policies, recently fattened-up 
to deliver stimulus post 2008, now blighted not just by prevailing fiscal austerities but are, in a 
more fundamental secular sense, withering away because the benefits of effective and the costs 
of dysfunctional system are simply not recognised in policymaking?  Housing policies are often 
dismissed by finance and treasury ministries because they are argued in distributional terms and 
are seen simply as fiscal displacement and redistribution rather than contributing to growth and 
productivity. Piketty’s framework, it is argued below, provides new ways to connect housing 
market outcomes to growth and to consider how housing policies might be changed to both 
reduce inequality and raise growth and productivity. That process is likely to be helped by 




3. The Broad Approaches: Changing Political Economy and Piketty 
 
Changing Perspectives within Economics; Piketty in Context. 
Economics has, for almost half a century, paid little attention to income and wealth distribution.4 
Paul Krugman (2014) notes that ‘Some economists (not to mention politicians) tried to shout 
down any mention of inequality at all’ and he quotes Robert Lucas the most influential 
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macroeconomist of his generation, as noting, in 2004, that “Of the tendencies that are harmful to 
sound economics, the most seductive, and in my opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on 
questions of distribution”. Economics education until the 1970’s required an understanding of 
welfare economics (Nath,1971; Dobb, 1965; Little, 1949) that explored ‘value judgments’ 
embedded within ‘technical’ economic models. For instance, Samuelson’s (1948) analysis of 
Pareto optimal outcomes highlighted that their desirability was contingent on the appropriateness 
of the prior income distributions that drove ‘free’ market choices. Lucas’s remark is an acute 
example of how economics had come to focus upon modelling, indeed reifying, theoretical 
market processes. Neoclassical economists often simply accepted the embedded value judgments 
rather than reflecting on distributional outcomes and whether they matched widely acceptable 
value judgments’ about preferred social outcomes and choices.  
Recently several major economists have broken ranks with the mainstream and have built upon 
the longstanding conceptual and empirical foundations of scholars such as Sen (2010) and 
Atkinson (2012). They have established renewed interest in the patterns and costs of inequality, 
especially within poorer and emerging economies. Stiglitz (2006; 2012) and Sachs (2008) have 
prised the top from a Pandora’s box of distributional issues. Piketty has now shattered that lid. 
His sustained empirical work (Piketty, 2011: Piketty and Saez,2013: Piketty and Zucman, 2014: 
Piketty, 2015c) on changing patterns of wealth, now supplemented by the development of a 
theoretical framework in CTFC (Piketty,2014), sets a new context for addressing distribution and 
growth.  
 
Capital in the 21st Century: Key Aspects  
CTFC is a volume rooted in, but not restricted to, applied economics. It utilises microeconomic 
principles and linkages that range from the individual to the macro economy and that work at the 
interface between issues of growth and the distribution of income and wealth. Whilst thoroughly 
modern in its economic techniques, and Piketty spares readers more detailed mathematical 
theories of growth and distribution (published elsewhere, see Piketty 2015b and 2015c), the work 
draws on three earlier traditions in economics that contrast with current approaches. The focus 
on property of all kinds, including land and housing, links back to classical economists and 
differs from the modern capital-labour emphasis. The use of ‘stylised facts’ underlying the 
specification of high level growth concepts reflects the 1950’s growth modelling of Myrdal 
(1956) and Kaldor (1966). And above all Piketty restores the perspective of political economy to 
centre stage of debate within economics.  
Following Piketty’s introduction, the next three sections of CTFC are essentially a melding of 
empirical and analytical approaches. These are, in turn: theoretically informed reflections of the 
interrelations, for any particular economy, between income distributions and the economic 
growth rate; the more historical, empirically oriented approach is evident in ‘The Dynamics of 
the Capital/Income Ratio’ which, for a number of countries, tracks changing patterns of 
inequality through centuries; ‘The Structure of Inequality’ then provides strong empirical 
evidence about now strengthening inequalities in the advanced economies. The final substantive 
section, ‘Regulating Capital in the 21st Century’, is where the political economy perspective 
prevails and Piketty outlines policies to address growing wealth inequalities and their adverse 
consequences for modern democracies. 
   What makes CTFC central to contemporary debate is its explicit political economy perspective, 
the focus, on wealth and income distributions, and the long insightful gaze over rigorously 
researched historical time series of change. These main contributions of Piketty are reviewed in 
section 4 and critiqued in section 5. 
 
 
2. Piketty in Perspective. 
 
1) Restoring Political Economy 
In assessing Piketty’s political economy Kunkel (2014) argues that ‘The story of modern 
economic thought can be told as the shift from political economy to the discipline now simply 
called economics’. Kunkel, echoing the earlier observations of Eichner (1983), labels modern 
economics as a quasi- scientific approach that ‘lent itself to constructing mathematical alibis for 
capitalism, whose real behaviour it studiously ignored.’  He further observes that the ‘the notion 
of economic life as a matter of individuals harmonising their preferences, as opposed to classes 
wrestling for control of shop-floor and government, has filtered into common sense’.  These 
observations contain two critiques, one about the technical approach of the discipline and the 
other about its embedded, hidden moral values.  
Mainstream, neoclassical economics approach to growth and distribution issues starts from a 
presumption of well-informed individuals in competitive markets that are in, or moving towards, 
a dynamic equilibrium. Kunkel, in positioning Piketty, is relentless in his critique, and continues 
‘In general, economists favour mathematical modelling of axiomatised exchange relations over 
economic and other kinds of history; concentrate on individuals rather than classes or groups as 
economic agents; emphasise the preferences freely expressed in transactions rather than 
restrictive social circumstances; and describe self-sustaining equilibria of supply and demand 
when capitalist economies are striking for their growth and instability.’  
Less reductionist versions of the model can cast useful light on aspects of market processes.  But 
it cannot be denied that such models take the existing distribution of income as appropriate, that 
individuals are the best judges of their own welfare and that human emotions, love or jealousy 
for instance,  that lie outside such frameworks are unimportant.  
Piketty’s strong commitment to a political economy approach, that pays explicit attention to 
distributional issues, is apparent in the introduction to CTFC and his work over the last decade 
(Piketty, 1997; Piketty, 2015).  Piketty provides a useful summary of different perspectives, 
including Marxian and neoclassical views, on income distributions. He dismisses the 
appropriateness of both and, whilst seeking to retain the quantitative rigour of current economics 
he rejects neoclassical marginal productivity notions of the determination of returns to factors of 
production and stresses how norms and power may shape rewards. In doing so, in marrying 
empirical work and recast conceptual models, he creates a new space for debate within 
economics on the political economy of inequality.  
 
2) Piketty’s Theories and Models 
In neoclassical economics there is an intimate connection between distribution and growth. The 
reductionist theoretical framework allows both precise mathematical solutions and an 
equilibrating system. Within the model competitive markets set prices (rewards) for labour and 
capital. With given market demands and the existing state of technology, the supply of different 
factors of production shapes rewards and rates of factor usage. The production function, which 
sets out the technical relationships between factor inputs and overall output levels is crucial. A 
critical parameter is the elasticity of substitution for a given factor (say labour). As labour 
becomes more available and its price falls, producers will use less (substitute away from) capital 
and towards more labour.  If inputs increase in equal proportions a critical issue is whether 
output increases faster (increasing), slower (decreasing) or at the same rate (constant) as output. 
Returns to scale and the elasticity of substitution are key parameters in the production function. 
Growth models assess how changes in factor supplies impact growth patterns. 
In theory, the production function is an expression of the technical possibilities of the economy 
and it is a physical relationship; physical measures of output are related to numbers of people and 
machines. In reality, however, there are problems in aggregating the diverse capital stock 
deployed in an economy; it is impossible to add up different kinds of machines into a single 
figure. Similar problems apply in measuring diverse human capital stocks. The need to ‘add up’ 
leads to the redefinition of the production function relationships in terms of the values of capital 
stock, rather than physical machinery, other inputs and outputs. 
 
Capital or Wealth? 
In understanding CTFC it is crucial to recognise that ‘capital’ for mainstream economists is not 
‘all property’ but the capital stock used in production estimated from market values. Let us call 
this production capital. Piketty uses a concept of capital, property, that is wider than production 
capital and defines capital as “the total market value of everything owned by the residents and 
government of a given country at a given point in time, provided that it can be traded on some 
market.” (Piketty 2014, p. 48). This definition includes ‘production’ capital but also land, 
housing, antiques, art or anything capable of yielding investment returns. In Piketty’s work 
‘wealth’, ‘property’ and ‘capital’ are the same. In conventional economic estimates of capital, 
with the focus on capital structures and assets that contribute to output (production capital), the 
value or volume of the capital stock used in the economy is estimated by applying depreciation 
rates to past investments in productive assets. This exercise does not make allowances for 
changing asset prices (other than through the effects of depreciation).  
Weil (2015) stresses this is the appropriate way to measure capital in production and, in 
commenting critically on Piketty, uses a housing example to illustrate the difference between 
capital and wealth. He argues, ‘Consider the example of imposition of rent control, which is one 
of the policies that Piketty discusses in the context of reduced capital valuations in the middle of 
the twentieth century. Mandating a below-market rent lowers the value of the stream of rental 
payments that a landlord can expect, and thus lowers the market valuation of a piece of rental 
property. But while rent control destroys market wealth, it doesn’t destroy capital’. Weil 
concludes that Piketty’s focus is not on the implications of capital accumulation for aggregate 
output, as discussed above, but rather on the social and political implications of wealth 
accumulation and wealth inequality.   
Weil’s observation on rent control effects may be correct in the short run, though less valid for 
the longer term. However, it can be argued that Piketty’s emphasis on wealth will lead to more 
informed understanding of real market macroeconomic change than ‘correct’ neoclassical 
production function definitions. Wealth, whether based on saving, investment in productive 
capacity or speculation in other assets, is a measure of a household’s command over resources, 
not simply ownership of the production base. Taking housing as an example, it is clear that the 
instability, reward, savings and investment effects of changes in housing wealth will have 
impacts on the growth path of an economy and they cannot simply be separated out as 
‘distributional issues’. If households invest their savings in driving up the price of existing bricks 
and mortar rather than investing in human capital or forming new firms, then long term growth 
and productivity are likely to be lower.  
Piketty, by focussing on wealth including housing and land, takes us to the heart of the issue of 
the roles of rentier returns and investment in land, property and housing, and key features of 
these assets, in contemporary economies. Arguably the modern neoclassical synthesis does not. 
The Model 
Piketty’s ‘macro-conceptual’ model links changes in the concentration of wealth to economic 
growth. The model is more in the spirit of classical economists, including Marx, than 
contemporary multi-equation econometric models. It is a framework for broad thought 
experiments. Within CTFC there is not a detailed modelling of how income and wealth is 
redistributed into the hands of particular groups. In other papers Piketty outlines much more 
technical, theoretical arguments (2015b, c). 
Piketty develops his model to frame his major empirical findings, see section (5), and explain 
why inequalities, counter to the Kuznets (1953) conventional wisdom, appear to widen over time 
in modern economies. The core of his model is that, first, an unequal distribution of wealth is 
reinforced by high rates of saving from wealth based returns rather than labour income. And, 
second, that a high elasticity of substitution between capital and labour allows capital, or 
property, to grow without inducing a fall in the rate of return to property that would attenuate the 
growth in the share of capital/property based income (and this proposition runs counter to the 
equilibrating tendencies of neoclassical models).  It is much easier to imagine, with capital 
defined as ‘wealth’, such outcomes occurring in fast growth urban housing markets with supply 
inelasticity raising housing wealth, than in the context of a productive enterprise characterised by 
a conventional production function. 
There are three key components in Piketty’s model; an identity, a theoretical proposition and a 
conditional empirical observation.  
The identity is,   a=rB        (1), 
where a is the share of capital income received in total income, r is the rate of return received on 
capital (patrimony) and B is the wealth (or capital) to income ratio. This relationship holds true 
by definition. 
The theoretical relationship is,   B= S/g, or that S =gB.         (2), 
where S is the savings rate from national output or income and g is the growth rate of the 
economy.  
It is important to note that not all wealth gains have to be saved. They may be consumed and tax 
policies may also drive a wedge between gross potential savings and the surpluses that enter the 
savings, and wealth, stocks of individuals. That is S, and B are influenced by the behaviours of 
individuals and governments. Cowell et al (2013) explored the different relationships between 
income and wealth inequalities within single nations (for instance Sweden has relatively low 
income inequality and high wealth inequality). They noted that the transformation of returns, 
from labour or capital, into current savings and stocks of wealth can be shaped by variations in 
the national propensity to save, systematic differences in asset classes preferred, cross country 
differences in inheritance behaviours, the propensity for individuals to pay taxes to pay for old 
age provision as opposed to accumulating assets for retirement and the life cycle structure of the 
population. There is much to be done, as outlined in Mankiw’s (2015) critique of the Piketty 
model (see below) to explore beneath the surface of Piketty’s ‘big ideas’ and much scope for 
policies, including housing policy, to modify the relationships between r and g. 
This last observation is important because, Piketty’s empirical generalisation is that he expects 
the patterns of the last 30 years to continue into the 21st century. In particular, he predicts that r 
will be greater than g, perhaps by a larger amount than at present. Piketty (2014, p. 571) boldly 
calls this fact “the central contradiction of capitalism” as he argues that ‘if r > g, the wealth of 
the capitalist class will grow faster than the incomes of workers, leading to an “endless 
inegalitarian spiral” (p. 572). This means that returns to the owners of capital, r, will be growing 
faster than overall income per capita (meaning that investment incomes are rising faster than 
wages) and, in consequence, that wealth inequalities will rise. Increasing inequality occurs 
because the ownership of faster growing patrimony based returns is concentrated relative to 
incomes in general. By implication, unless S is attenuated by other factors such as growing 
taxation or conspicuous consumption, the wealth to income ratio will increase. A further 
implication is that inheritance rather than returns from one’s own economic activities begin to 
dominate the actual distribution of wealth.  As Krugman (2014) notes ‘when the rate of return on 
capital greatly exceeds the rate of economic growth, “the past tends to devour the future”: 
society inexorably tends toward dominance by inherited wealth.’ 
It follows from the above that if returns to land or housing constitute a growing share of total 
income (that is the share of housing in B rises) and B is also rising, then wealth inequalities will 
increasingly reflect patterns of home and land ownership and prices. Piketty argues, on his 
evidence base, that most commonly r exceeds g, and economies will tend to rising inequality 
unless governments seek to change that outcome.  We return to these issues in the discussion of 
housing assets in section 6 below. 
Criticisms of the Theory and Model. 
Criticisms of Piketty’s models have been concerned mainly with the definition of capital, the 
identification of r, the omission of labour market income and demographic effects. Much of this 
critique is directed at challenging the likelihood that r will exceed g into the longer term. 
 Mankiw (2015) and Auerbach et al (2015) add to Weil’s (2015) critique of Piketty’s all-
embracing notion of capital. Arguably, as explained above, Piketty’s formulation is more 
appropriate for examining inequality where the existence of property and housing have ‘rentier’ 
effects. Auerbach et al also note, correctly, that r will reflect risks, and will be higher in periods, 
such as wars and depressions and that r should be risk adjusted. They also argue that the relevant 
concept of r for additions to wealth is the after tax rate of return. Taking these considerations into 
account for the USA they conclude ‘the apocalyptic r > g “exploding wealth inequality” 
scenario does not look especially likely.’  
Some critics have highlighted the de-emphasis of labour market incomes in Piketty’s analysis. 
Goodhardt (2015) has claimed that the reported patterns of r are consistent with the predictions 
of neoclassical growth models and reflect long-term demographic effects on labour markets. 
Moreover, future population ageing will see wage based wealth rise (and K/Y fall) as workers 
become relatively scarce. This will attenuate rising r in relation to g. Yet Goodhardt’s 
conclusions seem to be unaware of how such dynamics have already played out to the 
disadvantage of younger workers in housing and labour markets (Mackie et al 2015; Ronald and 
Forrest, 2014). 
Krugman (2014) has argued that the wealth and incomes of the top 1pc of earners in the USA are 
partly explained by the approaches of corporate boards to senior executives’ pay. Auerbach et al 
(2015) reinforce the point and they argue that Piketty’s own evidence for the US, also reported in 
Furman (2014), actually suggests that the recent growth in before-tax income inequality is 
largely attributable to the growing inequality in wage and salary income. We note that this is not 
the case for all countries for which Piketty presents.  
Weil (2015) offers a wider critique of Piketty’s exclusion of human capital. He argues that 
‘Because human capital has increased so much over the period Piketty studies, inclusion of this 
form of wealth would undo his conclusion that the wealth/income ratio had been roughly 
constant.’ He notes that the inequality in the distribution of human capital is smaller than the 
inequality in market wealth and this pattern arises because households with limited investable 
funds will put them into family human capital, while wealthy households will put the bulk of 
their investment in non-human forms. Thus a broader measure of wealth will look less unequal 
than market wealth. This argument has some validity but the growing share of home-ownership 
from low and moderate income households into this millennium has certainly offered different 
asset choices that may have seen more households augment real estate capital rather than human 
capital (see further below).  
Weil’s point about the importance of measuring wealth systematically is well made.  The 
inequalities observed will depend on what is measured. Excluding human capital is problematic. 
Weil makes an important point regarding the exclusion of public wealth from Piketty’s measured 
estimates. He argues that it could be expected, even in poorer societies, that life cycle wealth 
several times as large as a year’s income could have been accumulated but such wealth is not 
evident for most people in the lower half of the income distribution. Weil concludes that is has it 
has been displaced by public policy interventions with households having claims on future 
government payments, or “public transfer wealth (Lee and Mason, 2011). Such forms of public 
wealth may be important for poorer and older households and its inclusion ‘greatly changes the 
picture of inequality painted by Piketty’s focus on wealth in the form of market assets’. 5 
The relevance of this point can actually be made clear by considering contexts, such as the UK, 
that have witnessed the diminution of public housing through its transfer to market ownership. 
Such transfers will usually have increased measured market wealth (but not real capital stock) 
and measures will not always record lost public wealth nor the effects of ending this public asset 
on the contingent public incomes of the poor. Within the housing sector this requires researchers 
not just to have regard to how housing price outcomes impact wealth but how housing policy 
changes impact the real incomes and broadly defined wealth of all. 
Piketty’s response to these criticisms has been to stress that labour market effects are crucial in 
shaping income distributions and that his model is limited in relation to other forms of income 
and commented (Piketty, 2015b) that ‘I certainly do not believe that r > g is a useful tool for the 
discussion of rising inequality of labor income… rise in labor earnings inequality in recent 
decades evidently has little to do with the gap r – g. Conversely he stresses the importance of 
r>g, “in the case of unequal incomes from capital, the most important processes involve savings 
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and investment behavior, laws governing gift-giving and inheritance, the operation of real estate 
and financial markets, and so on” (p. 243).  
 
Mankiw, as a preface to a more systematic rejection of Piketty’s position, comments ‘Piketty’s 
vision is a dystopia of continually increasing economic inequality due to the dynastic 
accumulation of capital, leading to a policy recommendation of a steeply progressive global tax 
on wealth’. Mankiw (2015) argues that the need of individuals to build an inheritance means that 
r>g is unlikely to lead to an “endless inegalitarian spiral”. Inheritors will consume wealth (and 
reduce stocks to transfer onwards). He too resorts to ‘stylised facts’ and suggests that with 
known estimates of the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, numbers of descendants 
and gaps between generations   of 35 years that wealth per descendant is likely to grow at a rate 
of r − 5. This, in his view makes cumulative concentration unlikely and will be less likely if tax 
effects on family wealth are also recognised as eroding bequests. With consumption, 
demographic and tax influences (r-7) > g becomes the parameter value that would allow 
cumulative wealth concentration. He suggests that such a scenario has neither been experienced 
nor likely in the decades ahead. He concludes ‘As a result, I don’t see it as likely that the future 
will be dominated by a few families with large quantities of dynastic wealth, passed from 
generation to generation, forever enjoying the life of the rentier’.  
 This is an over-extreme conclusion on Piketty’s work. With OECD countries reproducing at 
roughly replacement rates perhaps Mankiw makes too much of demographic dispersal of wealth, 
and conversely, makes too little of how inheritances and in-lifetime transfers of wealth, including 
housing wealth, from older to younger family members may have a major impact on wealth 
prospects and social mobility. That is, there is a real risk in some countries that with social 
mobility falling and wealth currently concentrated that the paths between present and future 
wealth distributions is sufficiently, unequally steep for different income group. Piketty’s 
concerns should be at the forefront of policy thinking, even as a cautionary concern, rather than 
relegated in the ‘not to worry about’ box.  
Piketty (2015b), in response to critics, has provided a technical elaboration on the r/g 
relationship and in Piketty 2015(a) he takes a less firm tone regarding r>g as the central 
contradiction of capitalism and says ‘ the way in which I perceive the relationship between r > g 
and wealth inequality is often not well-captured in the discussion that has surrounded my book—
even in discussions by research economists. I do not view r > g as the only or even the primary 
tool for considering changes in income and wealth in the 20th century, or for forecasting the 
path of income and wealth inequality in the 21st century. Institutional changes and political 
shocks—which can be viewed as largely endogenous to the inequality and development process 
itself—played a major role in the past, and will probably continue to do so in the future.’   
Piketty (2015b) stresses the importance of political and other shocks, in particular (p. 20), “the 
reduction of inequality that took place in most developed countries between 1910 and 1950 was 
above all a consequence of war and revolution and of policies adopted to cope with these shocks. 
Similarly, the resurgence of inequality after 1980 is due largely to the opposite political shifts of 
the past several decades.”  We conclude that Piketty’s central r/g relationship has meaning but 
does not operate independently of the political and policy settings within which it operates. The 
wealth distribution outcomes he observes may be already playing out in the ‘unpredictable’ 
electoral events in some Western economies. The importance of Piketty’s theorising has been 
subject to criticisms and his responses have given the debate a dynamic that has some way to 
run. However, there is wide agreement on the richness of his empirical contributions. 
3) Empirical and Historical Identification of Inequalities in Income and Wealth. 
 As economists moved attention away from income and wealth distributions, economic historians 
continued to examine how they changed over time. The Kuznets curve (Kuznets, 1978) 
represented the high point of such work, was based on half a century of annual observations after 
WW1, and demonstrated that inequalities tended to narrow within nations as incomes grew.  
The Kuznets curve represented conventional wisdom until Piketty and colleagues analysed 
different, longer databases to identify changing patterns of wealth inequality. They utilised tax 
records to explore income and wealth changes in more than 40 countries, some reaching back 
hundreds of years. They used broad definitions of income, discussed above, to include all assets 
on which households can receive a return (equivalent to the notion of ‘patrimony’) and they 
separately identified key sources of wealth, including housing assets and land.  
Piketty eschews the use of Gini coefficients, Lorenz curves and entropy measures to summarise 
distributional changes and instead focusses on the concentration of wealth and income in the 
hands of the top 1, 10 and 20 percent of the distribution. Some commentators have argued that 
this form of presentation matters. When presentations report technical measures they are often 
not understood. With shifting median (or average) incomes, explanations focus on processes that 
shift the broad income distribution, for rich and poor alike, and this highlights labour markets 
and skills effects of technical change and broader global processes. In contrast, focus on the top 
of the distribution and how it is moving faster ahead redirects attention to the power and 
behaviour of national elites and the ways in which politics deals with inequality (see Acemoglou, 
2015). 
CTFC is full of useful illustrations that show inequality is now increasing within the majority of 
economies. They confirm that the Kuznets curve referred to a very special historical period when 
wars, a major depression and (welfare) state reactions to them from the 1930s through the 1960s 
had destroyed wealth of the richest households whilst giving new support to the poor. It no 
longer serves to describe current patterns of growth and inequality.  
Commentators have pointed to other major patterns emerging. Paul Krugman (2014) has 
highlighted how Piketty’s approach draws attention to the growing affluence of the very rich.  
The share of overall income received by the richest 1 percent of Americans since the 1980’s (a 
fifth) now stands at levels last recorded before World War I (having fallen to a tenth in 1950). 
Piketty’s work has also revealed the importance of housing assets in increasing inequality within 
countries in recent decades. His work on France, stretching over 300 years, shows that the share 
of housing assets in total ‘patrimony’ has been, since the 1980’s, by far the dominant source of 
increasing wealth to income ratios and rising inequality.  A critique of this specific finding, by 
Bonita et al (2014), is considered further below.  
Piketty draws attention to similar patterns in other OECD countries and there is other research 
support for the broad directions of change he suggests. Main and Sufi (2014) note that from 
2010-2013 financial assets have had more marginal impact on wealth than housing assets. Over 
the whole period of their analysis from 1992 to 2013, the rise in wealth inequality arising from 
home equity was smaller in magnitude than for financial assets but still boosted overall 
inequality. Housing asset changes have also been argued by to have had different recent impacts 
in the UK. Although the overall share of housing in wealth has risen over the last half century 
and is skewed towards older and higher income households there is no hard evidence of any 
upward trend in housing wealth held by the top 1 percent. The high, and rising, housing asset 
values of a wide range of owners who fell outside the top 1 percent meant that wealth was de-
concentrated over quite a large range of wealthier groups (ONS, 2015). However, the wealth 
position of the two thirds who are owners and the third who are renters has diverged 
considerably over time. The ONS note that the Lorenz curve for UK property wealth is flatter 
than for financial wealth. Cowell et.al. (2013), using different data and approaches for four 
European countries and the USA, concluded that housing has a significant role in shaping 
household net wealth. Around the start of the millennium housing assets comprised more than 
four-fifths of household net wealth total in Italy, Finland and the UK and three fifths in the USA. 
The specific effects of housing assets on wealth inequalities differ from country to country and 
period to period.  Housing outcomes usually play important roles in shaping inequalities and the 
major policy concern may not be the housing assets held by the top 1pc but the overall wealth 
differences between those who have housing assets and those who have none. One could argue 
for many countries that what Piketty observed was the return of ‘land and property’, and a 
growing class of rentier housing owners, rather than capital in the conventional neoclassical 
sense. Piketty’s work makes a prima facie case that housing and land market outcomes have 
become not minor but major drivers of increasing inequalities within nations.  The case for more 
effective understandings of the role of housing within modern economies is all too clear. 
  
 
4) Policy Changes 
Piketty’s third major contribution raise policy implications for the future that arise from his 
expectation that  ‘r’ will again exceed ‘g’. A new era of enhanced inequalities and wealth 
positions driven by inheritance rather than effort is the likely prospect if policies continue as at 
present. And, from the housing perspective, much of that return may be driven by rentier actions 
rather than entrepreneurial behaviours (an issue that Piketty does not pursue in detail). This has 
major implications for the rate of productivity growth, g, and the returns to effort, merit and 
innovation. To paraphrase John Stuart Mill, many people may simply progress by lying in their 
beds (or, perhaps, their parents’ beds) sleeping as property values increase. 
Piketty’s policy presentations are somewhat confusing. In CTFC he emphasises the 
appropriateness of universal, or global, wealth taxes as the key policy instrument. Yet, as noted 
above, throughout CTFC, and in follow up work, Piketty himself draws attention to policy 
influences that impact ‘r’ and ‘g’ and the gap between them. In many respects whilst Piketty 
offers a key framework of high-level conceptual and big-picture empirical patterns real political 
economy, including housing policy, discussions have to be more detailed and nuanced. This is 
clear in the major policy frameworks advocated by Stiglitz (2015) and Atkinson (2014), and both 
approved of by Piketty. This is why a more detailed thinking of what Piketty implies for housing 
research and policy is required. Housing matters in his empirical analysis but does not feature in 
his policy discussion. 
 
5. Housing and Piketty’s Model  
Piketty’s work has important implications for how housing researchers and economists might 
think about major economic patterns within housing systems. His emphasis on capital as 
patrimony brings housing assets back into macro-thinking about distribution and, importantly, 
growth and productivity too. It is also important to consider is how housing policies and markets, 
and rising housing asset values in particular, will impact r and g.  
Excluding Housing Wealth. 
It is important to note that some critics have argued that Piketty is wrong to include housing 
wealth in capital accumulation. This is either because they focus only on ‘production’ capital or 
argue that housing wealth gains are largely illusory. Bonetti et al (2014) argue that measuring 
housing capital values from observed market prices is conceptually incorrect and that price 
changes and wealth effects should not be confused. There are essentially two economic 
arguments involved. The first is that house price gains by one individual mean a future loss for 
another (the individual who will have to pay the higher price, see Buiter, 2010).  However, 
though this may reduce net wealth gains, this process lies at the heart of the current 
intergenerational redistribution in wealth in many advanced economies and that has significant 
effects on savings, spending, wellbeing and productivity for younger households. The second 
issue is the commonly confronted in tax policy discussions, that housing is both a consumption 
good, valued at the rents it commands, and an investment good, yielding an income 
corresponding to the net rent. Landlords derive money income from letting their housing capital 
whereas home-owners receive their income as a flow of in-kind services that have only an 
implicit rent.  Bonetti et al argue that returns on housing capital, included in Piketty’s ‘r’ should 
be measured by the rent on housing and not traded capital values. When this measure of housing 
capital value is used the share of housing wealth in national income is relatively stable and the 
Piketty housing effect is reduced to minor, second-order roles in changing wealth patterns in 
France, the UK and the USA (for example). 
The arguments of Bonetti et al make insufficient allowance for the speculative motives that 
households have in holding housing assets and for the real operational nature of housing markets. 
The conceptual approach of Bonetti et.al. assumes that that capital and savings markets are 
perfectly competitive and informed (a somewhat heroic assumption in the light of recent 
experience), that transaction costs are negligible, that landlords and tenants also have perfect 
information and foresight, and that markets are in or close to competitive equilibrium and that 
supply responses are relatively elastic. It also assumes that the rental values observed and used to 
make alternative estimates are equilibrium market rents. Clearly in many settings, especially in 
Europe, observed rents are influenced by policy and regulation and do not directly reflect true 
market values.  
In short, the Bonetti et.al conception of the functioning of housing markets is not based on the 
evidence of housing economics (see Maclennan, 2012).  There is evidence that households may 
hold a stock of housing assets that exceeds their consumption requirement because they have an 
asset demand for housing that exceeds the consumption demand. The over-consumption of 
housing space by the elderly can be readily cited in support of this observation. Further, there has 
been an extensive growth of non-professional landlordism across many of the OECD countries 
since the mid-1990’s with landlords owning one or two properties. All the research evidence 
suggests that their perception of returns includes not just rental incomes but expected house price 
gains and that prices as much as rents shape their behaviour. 
Buiter’s work is always important in reminding housing experts not to claim too much for 
housing effects. But in this instance, that fact that ‘losers’ from price gains may be in the future 
also be negated by inheritance processes over time. For all of the assets included in patrimony, or 
capital, there is an element that derives from speculative returns and super-normal profits in 
which there are some other and future losers as well as current winners. But the fact that the 
gainers show up in the wealth distribution means that they have options about consumption 
smoothing, command over wealth and inheritance gift choices that those without housing asset 
choices do not have. These are not second order effects but central to understanding key 
processes in social mobility, ageing and investment. Indeed, in the paragraphs that follow we set 
out an argument, based on stylised facts drawn from housing and city research that suggests that 
housing markets and outcomes are embedded at the core of growth and inequality. Bonetti et al 
wish to exclude housing capital values from Piketty’s estimates because ‘The valuation of 
housing capital based on housing prices is actually disconnected from the inequality-generating 
process that the author (Piketty) wants to establish’. On the contrary, housing and land values, in 
potentially disequilibrium markets, lie at the core of current processes of capital accumulation. 
 
Including Housing in the Conceptual Core. 
It can be reasonably argued that Piketty’s patrimony perspective on wealth-holding helps 
understand the housing sector as a critical, transformative influence on wealth patterns in modern 
economies. But it can also be argued that housing economics research also supports Piketty’s 
view of the world. There are 4 key observations, or stylised facts, on the nature of housing 
systems that are pertinent.  
First, global economic growth is likely to be positive in the decades ahead (‘g’ exceeds 0), that 
growth will underpin shifts from rural to urban living and that faster growth especially in larger 
settlements that enjoy the benefits of significant agglomeration economies. In these localities the 
demand for housing, and especially for those in the bottom half of the income distribution, is 
income elastic (it will grow faster than incomes) and price inelastic (as a necessity for many, 
demands will not fall as prices rise). 
Second, supplies of labour and capital to expanding locations have become more elastic 
(growing labour migration and capital market deregulation) but supplies of developable land 
remain inelastic and housing supply elasticities are universally low. These inelasticities may 
reflect curtailed public investment in infrastructure and the interests of landowners and 
developers in slow rather than fast responses to rising market prices as well as planning system 
lags. Supply inelasticity is a fundamental rather than passing feature of housing systems and the 
interaction of spatially concentrated economic growth and housing supply inelasticity has a key 
role to play in shifting consequent wealth patterns 
Third, given what is known of the stylised facts of metropolitan housing markets, likely future 
spatial patterns of economic growth will see the interfacing of a rising, inelastic demand for 
housing with sluggish housing supply responses arising from both market failures and policy 
limitations. This creates a classic Ricardian context where rising demands will drive the scarcity 
premia on factors of production in short or fixed supply. The conditions set out above determine 
that housing and land values will rise faster than the overall (income) growth rate. As long as 
land and housing are privately owned and a ‘patrimony’ perspective on capital is employed, then 
the incomes and asset values of property owners will rise ahead of the overall growth rate. As 
Piketty observes, Ricardo’s scarcity thesis ‘meant that certain prices might rise to very high 
levels over many decades. This could well be enough to destabilize entire societies. The price 
system plays a key role in coordinating the activities of millions of individuals...The problem is 
that the price system knows neither limits nor morality.’  It is time to put this perception of 
housing markets, and house price rises, at the core of research and policy thinking. 
Fourth, central governments are withdrawing from supporting housing policies and new burdens 
of responsibility, and indeed financial obligations, are falling upon more local orders of 
government. However as policy autonomies localise, local housing systems are being more 
exposed, simply by greater reliance on market provision and cross border deregulation of 
financial and capital flows, to a greater variety of shocks that originate from other regions, the 
nation and the global system. More localised resources will have to confront more diverse policy 
risks and that constitutes a significant challenge for cities. But as they face that instability they 
will also confront a greater potential segmentation within their local systems and there is a 
danger that the Piketty processes will drive wider gaps between renters and owners. There is a 
growing reality that poorer households struggling to attain ownership goals and climb on the 
asset escalator will live in increasingly remote suburban locations with quality of life negatives 
and with risks of local labour market shocks.  
At the same time in the cities that feature in the middle and upper echelons of global production 
hierarchies there is a growing disconnection between high quality and high price city centre 
markets and the metropolitan areas and regions they are set within. Their development funding 
sources, their investors and their residents are often international or global in origin and, with the 
top of the domestic income and wealth distribution, live in neighbourhoods that become the 
spatial manifestation of the growing wealth and power concentrations of the elites. Global 
enclaves will sit within local housing systems, they will impact local change but they will be 
little influenced by local policy autonomies. Localism in housing policy will not deal with all the 
structures and inequalities that are emerging in advanced economy cities 
  
6. Addressing the Issues, Broad Concerns and Conclusions 
Taking an understanding of housing issues together with the insights of Piketty’s model there is a 
potentially alarming prospect for housing and economic outcomes in many OECD cities. The 
fundamental nature of housing markets in modern economies is that they present the potential for 
growing concentration of wealth and for r to exceed g for long periods. A high r driven by rising 
house prices raises upper and middle income wealth. It will also tend to reduce the disposable 
incomes of poorer, younger and renting households. Intergenerational inequalities will rise and 
social mobility for the children of larger, rental households will fall. A further possible 
consequence is that the diversion of savings and investment into existing housing assets will 
hamper productivity and growth. 
In this view of the modern housing economy, the OECD countries have come to organise their 
housing systems as mechanisms for encouraging rentier returns and increasing wealth and 
income inequalities. Housing policies, arguably, now foster wealth inequalities rather than 
reducing disposable income disparities. And there is little sense of how housing serves as 
essential economic infrastructure to facilitate productive sector growth. 
Nations are not rising to these challenges. Housing policies have diminished in scale and status 
in much of the OECD over the last three decades, in the period when Piketty highlights the 
reappearance of rising wealth inequalities. It is time for nations, and international bodies too, to 
review and rethink policies for the housing sector in the ways that Atkinson has for the labour 
market. And they need to do so within a reconceptualised housing-economy relationship 
informed by Piketty’s insights. 
It was not the purpose of the paper to spell out these policy issues and priorities but to draw out 
the housing research and policy questions that CITC poses. Capital in the 21st Century provides 
new insights on changing wealth patterns and thought frameworks to examine them. It provides a 
strong set of foundations on which to think through housing related issues and to urgently evolve 
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